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ABSTRACT
Recently, companies are expected to continue generating profits while mainta-
ining the highest standards of governance internally. In reality it seems like a missi-
on impossible. The author shows some blind alleys in recent professional literature. 
He deals with the inappropriate definitions of stakeholders together with the weakly 
defined purpose of corporations and their performance as well. Better solutions are 
proposed. They require quite big changes in theory and practice, especially in both 
education and political system.
Keywords: corporate governance, social responsibility, sustainable develop-
ment, value added, company’s performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There are vigorous debates about corporate governance in professional 
literature. A special topic are discussions from social responsibility point of 
view. Some authors think that most of the business globally is carried out by 
corporations. They are therefore very influential in shaping the growth of eco-
nomics of the world (e. g. Aneja, 2015, 155). The result is that economic inter-
est of the corporations and the expectations of society sahould be in a mutual 
existence. It is reflected in several ideas of corporate governance, sustainable 
wealth creation, corporate philanthropy and advocacy for the goals of the 
community (Aneja, ibidem, Jamal et al., 2008). It seems quite reasonable, but 
all of these ideas have some crucial weaknesses. One of them is the fact that 
debates on corporate social responsibility are becoming similar to the philan-
thropy. The second weakness are attempts to declare corporate responsibility 
from stakeholder point of view. Both deficiencies lead to the discussions about 
morality of capitalism (e.g. Penacchi, 2021) or to the emphasizing of human 
rights (e. g. Sharma, 2018). It will be discussed deeply in the continuation to 
show that such debates are directed to blind alley, without an important effect 
on both theory and practice.
2. DELUSIONS ABOUT STAKEHOLDERS
A relatively large diversity of stakeholder definitions in professional litera-
ture1 is obvious, so it is useful to structure or classify them appropriately. In 
addition, the classification of stakeholders is important in terms of the content 
of reporting required by the IESBA Code in point 220 (IESBA, 2018) as well. 
One option is to classify stakeholders into internal (e.g., shareholders, manage-
ment, employees) and external (e.g., business partners, creditors).Such a divi-
sion is simple, but not suitable for a more detailed discussion and analysis of 
stakeholders. More detailed is the model, which divides stakeholders into in-
vestors, customers, suppliers, and employees (Boatright, 2000, 357). The same 
author suggests a division into investors, political groups, customers, employ-
ees, trade associations, suppliers, government, and communities as a more ap-
propriate model (Boatright, ibidem). The problem with the above rankings of 
stakeholders is not only their number, but above all their diversity of interests. 
On this basis, conflicts between stakeholders can arise, which the corporation 
must take into account (e.g. Prindl, Prodhan, 1994). Clearly, it is essential that 
corporations manage and coordinate the different interests of stakeholders. 
The professional literature usually contributes to this by classifying stakehold-
ers, but usually only in the form of a more detailed list of stakeholders’ types, 
1  More about it in Bergant (2021).
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such as: customers, partners, employees, trade union, local community, soci-
ety, government, NGOs, associations, competitors, suppliers, investors , share-
holders (Pohl, Tolhurst, 2010).
Some authors think about corporate social responsibility, in this way: 
“companies are legally responsible to shareholders and strategically respon-
sible to stakeholders” (e. g. Brooks, Dunn, 2018). Although the separation of 
legal and strategic corporate social responsibility is in some ways contrary to 
the consistently understood principles of sustainable development, we must 
conclude that the essence is certainly the corporates’ responsibility to stake-
holders, which includes shareholders as well. It is therefore important to find 
out why the company should be accountable to stakeholders. 
The main stakeholders’ characteristics is that they bear some risk, con-
nected with the corporation business. This fact offers a new (better) defini-
tion of stakeholders, namely: stakeholders are those who contribute to risk man-
agement in the company’s operations in creating value added. This contribution 
means that the stakeholder assumes a certain part of the risk in the company’s 
operations. At the same time, this fact also provides a substantive basis for 
justifying the company’s liability to the stakeholders from corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) point of view.
From the point of view of risk-taking, stakeholders can be divided into:
1. Governors and management who, in addition to bearing the risk, also 
contribute to risk management through their decisions; these are 
mainly employees who are co-owners and partners or majority share-
holders (active co-owners of the company’s capital) and top manage-
ment, but they can also be others (e.g. business partners who contrac-
tually assume part of the risks by participating in the joint venture or 
in the case of strategic outsourcing).
2. Non-governors, i.e. those, who bear a negligible small part of the com-
pany’s risk and whose common feature is that they are directly or indi-
rectly affected by better or worse results from the company’s operations, 
but they cannot directly influence business decisions; however, they 
have the possibility of different types of control. Non-governors are:
 y Financiers or creditors to whom interest belongs;
 y Employees as non-co-owners as bearers of intellectual capital;
 y Trade unions;
 y Supervisory authorities within the corporation; 
 y The state, to which the taxes belong;
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 y Minority shareholders and portfolio investors to whom dividends or 
other forms of participation in surplus value added belong (inactive 
co-owners of the company’s capital);
 y The narrower and also wider society in various organizational forms 
that may be affected by the association, for example through its en-
vironmental policy;
It should be emphasized that these groups are not static, but change, as 
their interest can change relatively quickly for a variety of reasons. This means 
that group members (individuals or associations) move from one group to an-
other. Stakeholders’ interest varies depending on how strongly they feel the 
risk they are exposed to. This feeling is more and more present with the devel-
opment of civilization, especially informatics and media. It also increases the 
interest in greater influence in the corporate operations. The above definition 
of stakeholders is mainly principled, as they also differ according to which cor-
poration (and its specifics) we have in mind. The final definition of stakeholders 
is therefore objectively conditioned by the concretely selected entity.
It logically follows from the word stakeholder that stakeholders should 
also participate (in the proportion to the risk taken) in the value added cre-
ated within the corporation. This statement requires additional explanation 
in next section.
3. DELUSIONS ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION
The definition of the purpose of companies is a crucial starting point for 
the discussion of their governance. Unfortunately it is an area of many dis-
cussions without a clear results. There are two opposite sides. On one side, 
there are the authors, who argue that profit is not the only purpose and that 
organizations should make a drift from profit maximization to value maximiza-
tion, because of considering also the stakeholders’ interests (e.g. Freeman et 
al., 2010, p. 24). On the other side, there are the authors, who still stubbornly 
defend shareholder value as a main purpose of organizations, especially on 
long-term (e.g. Edmans, Gosling, 2020). Hence, the dilemma still remains vital 
and unsolved. Such a situation diminishes the value of stakeholder theory and 
all efforts regarding the development of corporate social responsibility remain 
almost near to philanthropic principles (Bergant, 2020).
Therefore, “new eco-political theories of social responsibility will remain 
on paper because the power structure— the dynamics of the economic sys-
tem —has not changed” (Adizes, 2020a). Adizes even named coronavirus pan-
demic as a missed opportunity to make strategic changes that humanity needs 
to survive (Adizes, 2020). The basis of power structure that Adizes mentioned, 
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is obviously the corporate law that gives the right of deciding about the profit 
use to the owners of capital.
It is really astonishing that nobody mentions that this part of the law has 
not any economic or some other logic. Nevertheless, it results in the opinion, 
that “shareholders are the owners of the firm” (e.g. Henningfeld et al., p. 17). It is 
purely arbitrary statement. In this way, the problem of possible predomination 
of shareholders’ interests, remains not solved. This allows a position, where 
self-interested managers pursue their own interests at the expense of society 
and the firm’s financial claimants (Jensen, 2002, p. 242). It means a new starting 
point for discussion about organizations’ purpose.
It is therefore important to find out why the company should be ac-
countable to stakeholders. Most important is the ethical principle of fairness 
enforced by the value-added law. Every contribution to the creation of value 
added should be properly evaluated and rewarded. The contribution to the 
creation of value added also means the contribution to the reduction of busi-
ness risk (Bergant, 2017). The value-added law has to be considered. It means 
that a proper system of distributing value added among all stakeholders, who 
bear a risk, should be established. Otherwise, the entropy of all organizational 
systems will grow uncontrollably because of the value-added law, which says 
(Bergant, 2017):
1. Value added is the net outcome of the organizational system in man-
aging the risk inherent to the system and belonging to risk holders in 
proportion to their contributions to the functioning of the organiza-
tional system (the aspect of creating value added).
2. The disproportionately high or disproportionately low participation 
of individual risk carriers in the value added (according to their work 
contribution) increases the entropy of the organizational system and 
threatens the realization of its sustainable development (the aspect of 
value-added guidance).
The value-added law is a general law because of its validation in all so-
cio-economic systems (past, present and future ones), which are oriented to-
wards sustainable development and all human associations, including fami-
lies.2It is valid and operates also for only two people and through the entire hu-
man history. The value-added law operates regardless of the wishes or activities 
of the people and regardless of the normative organization of the organizational 
system or its environment. It is, therefore, totally independent of the human will.
The above statements offer a new (better) definition of stakeholders, 
namely: stakeholders are those who contribute to risk management in the 
2  None of the partners in the family usually does not want to be exploited.
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company’s operations in creating value added. This contribution means that 
the stakeholder assumes a certain part of the risk in the company’s opera-
tions. At the same time, this fact also provides a substantive basis for justifying 
the company’s liability to the stakeholder from corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) point of view.
On the basis of the value-added law, the entropy of organizational sys-
tems is mainly the result of the imbalance between participants’ contributions 
and their participation in value added. This imbalance is devastating because it 
works against cooperation and mutual trust, which is necessary in the context 
of interdependence (Judt, 2011, 57 and 80).
The contribution to the functioning of the organizational system (in differ-
ent forms of managing the risk) is given by stakeholders of the organization. 
The participation in managing the corporate risk is at the same time also a 
criterion for the definition of stakeholder according to previous section.
The value-added law in its own way shows the shortcomings of various 
theories of a firm, including contract theory. An attempt of improvement 
presents a contracting theory of organization that sought to take into ac-
count the interests of all stakeholders (e.g., Scott, O’Brien, 2019, p. 312, Kálay, 
2002). This attempt has remained halfway through, as it still assumes profit 
as basic information.
4. DELUSIONS ABOUT CORPORATE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
It is understandable that good governance leads to good corporate perfor-
mance. Therefore, appropriate measures of corporate performance should be 
monitored. From sections above, it is clear that following profit instead of value 
added is not the right way. Profit cannot be a basis for sound stakeholder policy. 
At the same time, corporate governance should consider long-term view. 
It means that only triple bottom line (e.g. Elkington et al, 1998) which encom-
passes economic, social and ecological is the right direction of corporate pol-
icy from social responsibility and sustainable society point of view. Therefore, 
traditional accounting should be improved as a basis of efficient and effective 
information system.
5. CONCLUSION
The possible conclusion out of previous sections is that there are possibil-
ities to overcome the dilemmas about corporate governance, especially from 
stakeholders’ and organizations’ purpose point of view. It is very important 
from social responsibility point of view as well. The highest responsibility lies 
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on academics and scholars who should find enough courage to overcome the 
indoctrinated opinion about the profit paradigm in capitalism.3 Otherwise, we 
all will become witnesses of growing entropy and the decay of the society.
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ZABLUDE O KORPORATIVNOM UPRAVLJANJU  
S MOTRIŠTA DRUŠTVENE ODGOVORNOSTI
SAŽETAK RADA
U posljednje vrijeme  se od tvrtki očekuje da nastave ostvarivati dobit, a da in-
terno održavaju najviše standarde upravljanja. U stvarnosti se to čini kao nemoguća 
misija. Autor prikazuje neke nejasne situacije u novijoj stručnoj literaturi. Bavi se ne-
prikladnim definicijama dionika, kao I loše definiranom svrhom korporacija i njihovim 
učincima. Predlažu se bolja rješenja, koja zahtijevaju prilično velike promjene u teoriji i 
praksi, posebno u obrazovanju i političkom sustavu.
Ključne riječi: korporativno upravljanje, društvena odgovornost, održivi 
razvoj, dodana vrijednost, poslovanje tvrtke.

